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Free Lunches? WTO as Public
Good, and the WTO’s View of
Public Goods
Petros C. Mavroidis*

Abstract
The WTO can be viewed as a public good in that it provides a forum for negotiations which
also produces the necessary legal framework to act as a support for agreed liberalization. To
avoid any misunderstandings, in this article the discussion focuses on the WTO as a forum
and a set of agreements, not on free trade. Since the legal agreements coming under its aegis
are for good reasons incomplete, the WTO provides an additional public good by ‘completing’
the original contract through case law. The importance of this feature increases over time as
tariffs are driven towards irrelevance. In turn, the WTO has no particular attitude towards
public goods provided by its Members.

1 Introduction
There are two dimensions in the discussion regarding the WTO and public goods,
depending on the perspective adopted: on the one hand, whether the WTO can be
viewed as a public good, and if so which aspects of the WTO? And, on the other, how
does the WTO view public goods?
To respond to the first question, I assume the commonplace definition for public
good (non-rival and non-excludable) and build on a distinction between the design
and the actual use of the WTO first discussed in Staiger.1 In short, the idea is that
the WTO is a public good in the sense that it provides a forum that is necessary to
address (negative) external effects stemming from the unilateral definition of trade
policies. Similar effects stem, in the classic formulation of the terms of trade theory,
from unilateral tariff-setting: trading nations have little, if any, incentive to control
for the effects of their tariffs on their partners; they will typically set them taking into
*

1

Edwin B. Parker Professor of Law at Columbia Law School on leave at the European University Institute,
Florence. I am indebted to Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert W. Staiger for their helpful comments. Email:
petros.mavroidis@eui.eu.
See R.W. Staiger, Report on the International Trade Regime for the International Task Force on Global Public
Goods (2004).
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account their own producer and consumer welfare. To the extent that they have bargaining power, they can affect terms of trade when doing so. Absent an international
agreement that will help ‘internalize’ similar effects, one could end up in a spiral of
unilateral tariff-setting that will be met by retaliatory responses.2 The GATT (and now
the WTO) is the instrument that helps to address this issue.3
In its original form, the GATT was meant to provide an insurance policy against
those incentivized to circumvent their tariff promise:4 this could happen since tariffs
could be decomposed into taxes for consumers cum subsidies to producers (equivalence propositions), and, thus, absent a commitment on domestic instruments as well
(such as domestic taxes and subsidies) the tariff promise could become meaningless.5
Baldwin,6 with his wonderfully simple yet highly accurate tide metaphor, explained
why it was only sensible for negotiators to focus initially on tariffs: high tariffs obscured
the ‘bite’ of non-tariff barriers (domestic instruments). Terms of trade can, moreover,
be affected through domestic instruments as well, and not just through tariffs. Indeed,
what is the difference between a 100 per cent import tariff and a 100 per cent consumption tax?7 And indeed, the gradual reduction of tariffs brought the bite of domestic instruments (policies) to the fore and negotiators were asked to address them in
order to preserve the value of their prior efforts: this is in essence the ‘bicycle’ and/
or ‘tricycle’ theory that Bhagwati developed in his writings8 that we discuss in more
detail infra. This is why to discuss the WTO as public good one needs also to focus on
the legal arsenal that has been added to the original GATT.
One caveat is necessary here at the outset: the WTO is not free for all; in fact
non-Members are excluded from using this forum.9 And to become a Member one

2
3

4
5

6
7
8
9

See Johnson, ‘Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation’, 1 Rev Economic Studies (1953–1954) 142.
The rationale for the GATT is not solely dependent on a prior espousing of the terms of trade explanation:
indeed the GATT has also been explained by some as an instrument to avoid future inconsistent behaviour (‘commitment’ theory): see J. Tumlir, Protectionism: Trade Policy in Democratic Societies (1985), and
more recently Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, ‘The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political
Pressures’, 106 J Political Economy (1998) 574. The persuasiveness of this theory to explain the original
GATT is doubtful in light of the very limited commitment regarding domestic instruments. Irrespective
of the rationale for it, it is the aspect of the GATT to serve as a forum for international trade negotiations
that makes it a public good.
See C. Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade (1949).
For a formal explanation see K. Bagwell and R.W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading System
(2002); Limão, Broda, and Weinstein,’Optimal Tariffs: the Evidence’, 98 Am Economic Rev (2008) 2032
have provided empirical proof of the theoretical terms-of-trade argument.
See R. Baldwin, Non-tariff Distortions in International Trade (1970).
See Ossa, ‘A New Trade Theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations’, 119 J Political Economy (2011) 122.
See J. Bhagwati, Protectionism (1998), and J. Bhagwati, Termites in the World Trading System (2008).
There is a caveat to the caveat: preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are now routinely notified between
WTO Members and non-Members (Bahamas, e.g., participates in the EU–Cariforum agreement.
This practice is contra legem, since Art. XXIV(5) GATT states that ‘[a]ccordingly, the provisions of this
Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs
union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a
customs union or of a free-trade area’ (emphasis added). Participation in a PTA does not amount, of
course, to participation in the WTO. Still, non-Members can be treated better than WTO Members in the
markets of some WTO Members with which they have formed a PTA.
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needs to pay a price, a ‘ticket to enter’ which, as the years go by, becomes more and
more expensive. A look into China’s Protocol of Accession as well as all protocols of
accession post-1995 and a comparison with accessions before the Uruguay round
amply prove this point.10 It follows that to start thinking of the WTO as public good
one needs to make a generous concession and think of it not as a good free for all but
as one only for its Members. Secondly, usually when referring to public goods one has
in mind private citizens enjoying, say, clean air or a park for free. Here the units of
account are states and not citizens and, as argued above, not all states.11
With regard to the second question addressed in this article, namely how does the
WTO address public goods, our discussion will be briefer: the rationale for brevity is
that the WTO has not developed a comprehensive approach towards public goods,
although indirectly its actions may not be inconsequential.
With this in mind, in section 2 we discuss the WTO as a public good; section 3 focuses
on the WTO’s (non-)approach towards public goods, while section 4 concludes.

2 The WTO, a Public Good
In this section, I build on Staiger,12 who distinguished between the creation/establishment of the GATT/WTO on the one hand, and its use on the other. In his view,
whereas the former has public good features, the latter is prone to use for private ends.
I find this distinction sensible. In what follows, I will concentrate a little more on the
GATT/WTO regime of today, that is, the trade institution as a law-making entity, a
point already noted by Staiger, albeit en passant.
Kindleberger13 observes that public goods are typically under-produced not
for the Galbraithian reason that private goods are advertised and public goods are not – but because
the consumer who has access to the good anyhow has little reason to vote the taxes, or pay his or her
appropriate share. Unless the consumer is a highly moral person, following the Kantian Catgeorical
Imperative of acting in ways which can be generalized, he or she is apt to be a ‘free rider’.

How much of this is true as far as the WTO is concerned?

A A Forum for Tariff Negotiations
The list of public goods provided by Adam Smith14 was limited to national defence,
law and order, and public works. Ever since, most people would agree that weights and
10

11

12
13

14

This is the natural consequence of mainly two factors: MFN (most favoured nation) trade is more of a
value nowadays than, say, 20 years ago, when accession to the GATT amounted to MFN-trade with countries controlling 60–70% of world trade, while it is nowadays over 90%. Moreover, it is typically former
non-market economies that have joined the WTO post-1995 and have been required to make changes in
many domestic policies before accession.
The WTO is excludable but not rival in consumption; that is, it exhibits the characteristics of a natural
monopoly, like fire protection, cable TV, or even uncongested toll roads.
Supra note 1.
See Kindleberger, ‘International Public Goods without International Government’, 76 Am Economic Rev
(1986) 1.
See A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).
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measures, language, and money would qualify as such. In the international sphere,
public goods are produced to serve common purposes. Political science has produced
two schools: the realists, who argue that public goods are produced by a leading power,
the ‘hegemon’, and the moralists (or institutionalists), who argue that hegemons set
in motion regimes of international cooperation. Krasner15 and Keohane16 (especially
the latter) discuss these schools in more detail. Of interest to us is that the free trade
regime is the outcome of British and the subsequent US hegemony that put in place
the regime for cooperation, the original GATT.17
Governments have a shared interest in the creation and maintenance of the WTO:
absent this forum, negotiations on mutually advantageous tariff concessions would
not have taken place and one would risk spiralling into retaliatory tariffs. At the same
time, it is hard to imagine why one trading nation would have the incentive to provide
this good – there is an undeniable collective action issue here.18
Bargaining involves bargaining externalities as well: this point is intimately linked
with the discussion under 2C infra, since trading nations will use the WTO to pursue private goods. Home will discuss tariff exchanges with Foreign on items of export
interest to Home and not to a third country. In extreme form, bargaining externalities
could put into question the very existence of the edifice: it is disturbing, to say the
least, that every time a negotiating round hits deadlock voices are raised to the effect
that the WTO edifice as such is in grave danger. Are such fears unfounded?
The response to this question is multi-faceted, and much of it depends on difficult to
quantify factors, such as willingness to invest political capital in the successful conclusion of rounds, etc. At a narrower level, Bhagwati19 first explained why, assuming the
bicycle goes the right way, the value of concessions made depends also on the continuation of the liberalization process. He20 expanded on that and produced what he termed
the ‘tricycle’ theory:21 developing countries will sometimes sign preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with other countries at the same development level, hoping to learn from
such PTAs without fearing massive disruptions from unequal competition; they will
then and only then move to non-discriminatory (MFN, most favoured nation) competition. The point is that the continuous existence and relevance of the WTO holds the key
in securing that past concessions will continue to be valuable to participants.
The GATT/WTO, by any reasonable benchmark, has been quite successful in dismantling tariff protection over the years.22 It has also managed to add an impressive
15
16
17
18

19
20
21

22

See S.D. Krasner, International Regimes (1983).
See R.O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (1984).
See D.A. Irwin, P.C. Mavroidis, and A.O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (2008).
In Mankiw’s inimitable expression, ‘markets work well when the good is ice cream, but they work badly
when the good is clean air’: see G.N. Mankiw, Principles of Economics (5th edn, 2008), at 226.
Bhagwati, Protectionism, supra note 8.
Bhagwati, Termites, supra note 8.
Inspired by the fact that timid children will go on to a bicycle after having first experienced a tricycle in
order to reassure and acclimatize themselves to having their feet off the ground.
Irwin, ‘Changes in US Tariffs: the Role of Import Prices and Commercial Policies’, 88 Am Economic Rev
(1998) 1015 and Irwin, ‘The Smoot–Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment’, 80 Rev Economics and
Statistics (1998) 326 provides the most comprehensive quantification of tariffs since the inception of the
GATT and leading up to the post-Uruguay round era.
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regulatory framework aimed at supporting the liberalization efforts, a point to which
we will come back in the next sub-section. Of course the problems surrounding the
continuing Doha round have cast some doubt on this rosy picture. There are mitigating factors explaining the current difficulties in concluding the Doha round and they
should be taken into account: there are more players, more agreements to be negotiated, a theme (trade and development) that is proving more difficult to tackle and
more divisive than originally anticipated, the impending US elections, etc. At any rate,
on present evidence, it will be quite an exaggeration to argue that the bicycle theory
no longer obtains in the multilateral trade talks.
The threat, if one exists, comes from the proliferation of PTAs, and more specifically from their content: Horn et al.23 examine the subject matter of PTAs concluded
by two hubs (EU, US) with various spokes between 1992 and 2008, and divide it into
WTO+ (‘WTO plus’, say tariff cuts beyond the MFN-level), and WTOx (‘WTO extra’,
issues that do not come under the mandate of the WTO, say positive integration in
fields such as environmental policy, the fight against corruption, etc.). The WTOx
part of the PTAs is quite substantial. This article thus suggests that the rationale for
going preferential should also be sought in WTOx-type obligations. There is, thus, a
discrepancy between the multilateral and the preferential agenda, and it could be that
the reason for going preferential has to do with the content of the agenda: it seems
plausible (although unproven as yet) to argue that PTAs are running away with the
trade agenda of the 21st century, while the WTO still operates in last century’s terms.
If true, then this would be the first serious scare for the multilateral system. As things
stand, nevertheless, it is too early to pronounce on this score.

B The WTO Law and its Completion
The point in the preceding sub-section was that the WTO seen as a forum for negotiating trade liberalization is a public good the preservation of which is a function
of its policy-relevance: to the extent that the WTO becomes policy-irrelevant, either
because of disinterest in multilaterally liberalizing trade from now on, or for any other
reason, then the point made falls.24
The WTO’s relevance is being challenged but not threatened, so far at least. The best
supporting argument for this thesis is that trade rounds (like the Doha round) are an
integral part of but do not exhaust the bicycle in the bicycle theory discussed above.
The WTO has life in between rounds: it administers the existing agreements, and it
completes them. Let us take each point in turn.
The WTO has in place dozens of committees which take care of everyday business: they run the notifications procedures aimed at reducing transaction costs,
decide on ‘agreed interpretations’ (like the definition of period of investigation in the

23

24

Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir. ‘Beyond the WTO: An Anatomy of the EU and US Preferential Trade
Agreements’, 33 The World Economy (2010) 1565.
Note that the recent US initiative to liberalize trade in services among some like-minded nations only, and
not across the total WTO Membership, is supposed to take place within the WTO in the form of plurilateral agreement. Similar initiatives are, thus, not undermining the policy relevance of the WTO.
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antidumping context),25 and even manage to settle an impressive number of disputes
so that the administrative burden for WTO adjudicating bodies is reduced.26 In a way,
this function of the WTO is a public good in itself, in that the WTO thus ‘completes’ the
originally ‘incomplete’ contract.
The point is that the WTO can generate public goods by clarifying for all its Members
the ambit and content of its various rules. This is best illustrated by the function of
the WTO adjudicating bodies and is intimately connected to the inclusion of domestic
instruments in the WTO edifice. Recall Baldwin’s intuition that the shift towards disciplining domestic instruments rationally followed the disciplining of border instruments. As far as time is concerned, the shift starts in the 1960s with the Kennedy
round, albeit in a timid way at first. It is the successful conclusion of the Tokyo – and
even more so the Uruguay – round that mark the definitive shift towards the multilateral disciplining of domestic instruments.
Yet, the inclusion of domestic instruments presented negotiators with more than
they could have handled: first, there is an extremely large number of different domestic policy instruments with a trade impact; secondly, domestic policies are responsive
to changes in the underlying economic/political environment, and as a result keep
changing themselves. One possibility would be that the agreement specified for each
Member the policies to be pursued in each and every situation that the Member might
find itself in – that is, that the agreement is ‘state-contingent’ in economic jargon.
But, of course, with the agreement intended to be in place for an extended period of
time, there would be a huge number of such different economic/political situations
that would call for different policy responses. As a result, WTO Members would have
to be in constant negotiation, which probably also means the absence of an international trade agreement: the costs of negotiating and drawing up such a grand contract would be huge, and would most likely greatly outweigh the gains it would bring.
Indeed, it would amount to central planning on a global scale. This is one reason why
trade agreements are ‘incomplete’, in the sense that they do not contain all the information necessary for their operation at the moment of their inception.27 Moreover,
contracting social policies might be deemed politically undesirable in some quarters.
Contractual incompleteness can of course, take many forms:28 undertakings may
not be conditional on changes in the environment, they can be ‘rigid’; undertakings
can also leave ‘discretion’ to individual governments to determine their policies unilaterally. The problem, of course, is that in this scenario, when discretion is permitted, there are good reasons to believe that governments have incentives to use such
discretion for protectionist purposes, as a substitute for the border instruments that
25

26

27
28

See Mavroidis, ‘No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practised by WTO Courts’, 102 AJIL (2008) 421 for
a more general discussion of secondary law in the WTO-context.
See, e.g., WTO Doc. G/TBT/29 of 8 Mar. 2011, where it is made clear that a number of disputes coming
under the aegis of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) are being resolved at the committee level.
See G.M. Grossman, H. Horn, and P.C. Mavroidis, Principles of World Trade Law: National Treatment (2012).
See Horn, Maggi, and Staiger, ‘Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts’, 100 Am
Economic Rev (2010) 394.
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have been bound. This is essentially where the political economy literature kicks in.
Contractual incompleteness by itself is not necessarily a problem; governance problems are posed when incomplete contracts are combined with opportunism.29 The
GATT does not eliminate the potential for such behaviour: WTO Members will usually
have private information when regulating which they have to reveal only in part (by
virtue of the transparency obligation) and a strong incentive to cheat (by pretending, for example, to be internalizing environmental externalities when acting solely, or
predominantly, in the interest of their domestic producer, and thus imposing costs on
their trading partners through beggar thy neighbour policies30).
Economic theory and the negotiating record see eye to eye on this score: the
Chairman of the Technical Sub-committee in charge of preparing the draft provision on national treatment (NT) during the London Conference in 1946 noted to this
effect:31
Whatever we do here, we shall never be able to cover every contingency and possibility in a
draft. Economic life is too varied for that, and there are all kinds of questions which are bound
to arise later on. The important thing is that once we have this agreement laid down we have
to act in the spirit of it. There is no doubt there will be certain difficulties, but if we are able to
cover 75 or 80 or 85 per cent of them I think it will be sufficient.

They thus knowingly left the provision ‘incomplete’, to be gradually ‘completed’
through subsequent adjudication (and, eventually, renegotiation). Some renegotiation did indeed take place: the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments is a good
example, but, nevertheless, it did not manage to resolve many issues. The GATT could
of course have been completed through renegotiation. The negotiating costs of this
procedure are quite high since de facto all of the WTO Membership has to be on board.
Kennedy32 discusses the implementation of an agreed TRIPs amendment to provide
empirical evidence of the very sizeable costs associated with this procedure.
In the absence of a (re)negotiated solution, it will be left to the WTO judge to decide
whether particular interventions do or do not contravene the spirit of the ‘incomplete’
contract. The GATT/WTO judge has indeed been called upon to do that through case
law.33 It is important to note at the outset of this discussion that the WTO is equipped
with a highly unusual (for international relations) dispute settlement system: the
compulsory nature of third party adjudication in the WTO means that a vast number

29
30

31
32

33

See Williamson, ‘Why Law, Economics and Organization?’, 1 Annual Rev L and Social Science (2005) 369.
Maskin and Tirole, ‘Unforeseen Developments and Incomplete Contracts’, 66 Rev Economic Studies (1999)
83 have persuasively argued that the manner in which we think about incomplete contracts is not optimal. They point out that, instead of discussing contingencies, contractual parties could be discussing
pay-offs. There are doubts, however, whether their model can fit the GATT. With respect to some of the
policies (potentially) covered by NT, it is at least doubtful that governments would be willing to negotiate
specific disciplines and (eventually) pay-offs.
UN Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/PRO/PV/7.
Kennedy, ‘When Will the Protocol Amending the TRIPs Agreement Enter into Force?’, 13 J Int’l Economic
L, (2010) 459.
See Maggi and Staiger, ‘The Role of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements’,
126 Q J Economics (2011) 475.
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of disputes have been submitted to it so far.34 Pushing the decision on to the adjudicating bodies is not risk-free, since, depending inter alia on the information in the original
contract (or lack of it), the judge may be committing errors (both false positives and/
or negatives). The allocation of the burden of proof as well as the quantum of proof
required will hold the key in developing a clear judicial strategy towards distinguish
wheat from chaff so to speak.
The WTO judge does not start from a clean slate and its hands are not free. The
judge is an agent bound by the agency contract signed with the principals, the WTO
Members. The contract reads:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve
the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.

It follows that the WTO judge cannot undo the balance of rights and obligations as
struck by the WTO Members: it must respect the policy space entrusted to the WTO
by all trading nations and transfer to the international plane sovereignty that the
principals did not themselves agree to transfer.35 Its job of course would have been
easier if the contract had been clearer, that is, more ‘complete’. Alas, it is not. Its discretion to clarify it is not open-ended either: the WTO judge, from the first case it was
called to address (US – Gasoline), has understood the reference to ‘customary rules
of interpretation of public international law’ included in Article 3(2) DSU as tantamount to a reference to the VCLT (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). The
VCLT contains many interpretative elements, but does not decide how much weight
should be given to each of them.36 Consequently, the WTO judge is in an unenviable position: it is called on to interpret one incomplete contract (the GATT) through
another (the VCLT).
From a purely methodological perspective, because the contract is incomplete the
judge must:
(a) decide on the coverage of this provision;
(b) decide on the understanding of its key terms.

34

35

36

Close to 440 disputes in its first 15 years, a record number of state to state adjudications where private
parties have no standing.
There is no stare decisis in the WTO. Still, the legitimacy of WTO courts depends largely on the manner
in which they treat their own case law. They are expected to apply the same law to the same transactions
irrespective of the identity of the parties involved in a particular dispute. There is definitely something
in the colloquial saying ‘justice must be blind’. When adjudicating on disputes, judges and courts will
be preparing their own demise: they will make law so predictable that in good faith there will be little to
argue about. Of course, new laws, and new knowledge regarding the manner in which specific issues
should be treated cast some doubt on this statement. The basic mould though should hold.
When following contextual, as opposed to teleological, interpretations respecting the in dubio mitius
maxim, the WTO judge runs a substantially lower risk of undoing the balance of rights and obligations
struck by the principals.
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Through case law, thus, WTO adjudicating bodies will be providing a public good by
clarifying the existing agreements which, for the reasons mentioned, are ‘incomplete’.37
Some might question that the law-making exercise (and its completion through
adjudication) is indeed a public good, and often for good reasons. Indeed, what kind of
public good is it to introduce an Agreement on Antidumping which legalizes decisions
taken without considering economy-wide welfare effects? In my view, similar arguments are misplaced because the counterfactual to the existing Agreement (which
is nowhere near my ideal scheme to deal with international price discrimination) is
‘the law of the jungle’: at least now an investigating authority will have to account
for a series of procedural requirements when imposing duties which on occasion constrain its discretion and might even lead to non-imposition. Absent this disciplining,
uncertainty would reign regarding the conduct of domestic institutions in charge of
trade policy. It is true that there is little theoretical and empirical work analysing the
value of WTO institutions (especially its legal institutions) in reducing uncertainty for
prospective exporters. A notable exception is Handley:38 in a dynamic model involving
heterogeneous firms he shows that uncertainty would delay the entry of exporters
into new markets and would also make them less responsive to applied tariff reductions. He tests all this empirically by investigating Australian imports in 2004 and
2006 to underscore his point that the WTO legal regime has a beneficial effect on
trade by reducing uncertainty regarding the exercise of trade policies at the national
level: the more the contract is ‘completed’ through case law, the less uncertainty survives of course.

C Making Use of the WTO for Private Ends
Proponents of the hegemonic theory will go so far as to argue that Home’s tariff
reductions are a public good, since many can profit from them. This view should not
be accepted; first, there is rivalry in consumption here since demand for goods is not
typically infinitely elastic. Exports by source A to Home’s market will diminish exports
by B of the same good to the same destination, even if B is not excluded from making
use of the concession. In the presence of rivalry in consumption, one cannot speak of
public goods, at least in its commonplace definition (no rivalry in consumption, and
no excludability). Secondly, Home will be asking Foreign to make tariff concessions in
a matter of interest to it and not necessarily to the rest of the world.
Staiger39 held correctly that the WTO is a public good used by trading nations to
pursue private ends. Pursuing private ends may lead to prisoner’s dilemma-type

37

38

39

Whether the WTO has done a good job in this respect is outside the ambit of this article, and is very much
a question of the benchmark used to evaluate the record so far. The various papers presented annually
in the ALI Reporters’ Studies suggest that the methodology used in reaching outcomes is wanting in the
majority of cases; even when they agree with the final outcome, all authors almost always disagree with
the methodology used by WTO adjudicating bodies.
Handley, ‘Exporting Under Trade Policy Uncertainty: Theory and Evidence’, WTO: Staff Working Paper
ERSD 2011–20 (2011).
Supra note 1.
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situations, and this is where our discussion supra regarding bargaining externalities
becomes relevant. The evaluation of the WTO insurance policy against this risk is
hard for a number of reasons. It is, of course, possible to leave the WTO, but no one
has left so far: does this suffice for a conclusion that the WTO is as strong as ever?
No, since ‘cheap’ temporary exit is possible through violations of the agreed obligations; the WTO is, after all, a self-enforcing contract where bargaining asymmetries
matter, so who would dare to retaliate against the EU or the US (other than either
of them)? And yet we do not see trade wars very frequently, and when they do occur
they concern a small, insignificant part of international trade. Bown’s40 edited volume strongly supports the conclusion that the WTO has survived not only bargaining
externalities but self-centred unilateral behaviour as well: post-crisis the evidence is
that few trading nations have had recourse to few – very few indeed by any reasonable
benchmark – trade protection measures. Theory has yet to come up with an explanation, as the many contributions in Bown’s volume suggest. Optimists support the view
that it is because of the WTO that the financial crisis did not turn into a trade crisis as
well. Indeed, the parallels with 1929 have been discussed in literature as have been
the divergent responses of the international community then and now.41 The bicycle
seems to be going in the right direction in this respect at least.

3 The WTO and Public Goods
The WTO has not adopted a particular stance towards public goods. True, the preamble does contain explicit language acknowledging that trade liberalization under
the auspices of the WTO should go hand in hand with
the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment …

Similar language would suggest that the bridge to supplying or aiding the realization
of public goods would be provided somewhere in the Agreement. It is not. The WTO
does not address public goods in a meaningful manner, that is, beyond the hortatory
language cited above which does not reflect legally binding obligations for its Members.
With the exception of TRIPs (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights), the WTO
is a negative integration contract, where domestic policies will be defined unilaterally
and, to the extent that they exhibit international spill-overs, the latter will have to be
internalized essentially through non-discrimination. The question whether a domestic policy yields a public good or not is simply immaterial to WTO law which cares only
about ensuring compliance with WTO, and not whether WTO Members pursue public
goods or not through their interventions.
The absence of common policies entails the absence of any discussion regarding a WTO view towards similar policies, assuming some of them could qualify as
public goods.
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See D.A. Irwin, Peddling Protectionism (2011).

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article-abstract/23/3/731/399900
by Columbia University user
on 18 April 2018

Free Lunches? WTO as Public Good, and the WTO’s View of Public Goods

741

The Appellate Body in its EC – Asbestos case law did state that it would adopt a more
deferential standard of review whenever public health was at stake, and this is the
only pronouncement to this effect. It did not link its standard to the provision of a public good though.42 In US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body was dealing with a challenge
to a US measure ostensibly aiming to protect a public good (clean air) and applied its
usual standard of review under Article XX GATT without controlling for the fact that
the protection of a public good was at stake.
One might think that the regulation of electronic commerce would point to a
different solution here: after all, electronic commerce is a vehicle of ideas, free
speech, etc. Yet electronic commerce is treated by the WTO as a mode of supply of
services which must, like any other mode of supply, respect the various disciplines
included in GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services), like national treatment, MFN, etc. There is no positive integration with respect to electronic commerce: the so-called ‘consensus statement’ adopted by WTO Members to this effect
is no more than an acceptance of the applicability of these principles (which do not
question the negative integration character of the GATS) in the sphere of electronic
commerce.43
One would have a hard time equating intellectual property rights with public
goods, since they are characterized by monopoly rents and hence by an elements of
excludability.

4 Conclusions
The analysis above points to the following conclusions:
(a) The WTO provides a forum for tariff negotiations that otherwise would not exist
because of a collective action problem. The forum can be viewed as a public
good in the sense that all WTO Members can profit from its existence and can
use it to advance private ends. The caveat here is that non-members cannot
have access to it.
(b) A legal arsenal to support the agreed trade liberalization is necessary for reasons having to do with the incentive of governments to renege on their promises (many times on political economy grounds). Unfortunately, nevertheless, the
legal arsenal is obligationally incomplete, and to this effect the WTO adjudication
process provides an additional public good by completing the contract for all WTO
Members.
(c) This WTO function is especially important between trade liberalizing rounds,
since the major part of adjudication concerns the interpretation of non-tariff
barriers: as tariffs are gradually reduced to irrelevance and most of protection
takes regulatory form, the value of case law gains in importance.
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The case concerned a regulatory barrier that would ban sales of asbestos containing construction
material into France.
WTO Doc. S/L/74 of 27 July 1999.
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(d) On the other hand, the WTO has nothing particular to say regarding its stance
towards public goods in terms of, say, a more deferential standard of review
towards them. The WTO disciplines on subsidies certainly ‘help’ WTO Members
to provide public goods themselves; as a matter of WTO law, though, there is no
incentives to do so, WTO Members remaining free to act as they deem best. This
is the unavoidable result of the quintessential character of the WTO contract
which, with the exception of the TRIPs Agreement, is a negative-integration
contract.
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